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Abstract
Defining cues for instrumental causality are the temporal, spatial and contingency relationships between actions and their
effects. In this study, we carried out a series of causal learning experiments that systematically manipulated time and
context in positive and negative contingency conditions. In addition, we tested participants categorized as non-dysphoric
and mildly dysphoric because depressed mood has been shown to affect the processing of all these causal cues. Findings
showed that causal judgements made by non-dysphoric participants were contextualized at baseline and were affected by
the temporal spacing of actions and effects only with generative, but not preventative, contingency relationships.
Participants categorized as dysphoric made less contextualized causal ratings at baseline but were more sensitive than
others to temporal manipulations across the contingencies. These effects were consistent with depression affecting causal
learning through the effects of slowed time experience on accrued exposure to the context in which causal events took
place. Taken together, these findings are consistent with associative approaches to causal judgement.
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Introduction
The ability to learn about causal relationships between events is
adaptive and enables people to learn to control their environment
or, at least, to interact with it effectively [1]. It isn’t surprising then
that psychological disturbance can affect people’s judgments about
causal relationships [2,3]. Moreover, the underlying mechanisms
through which such effects occur are of considerable interest, not
least because they can inform about the psychological disturbance
itself but also because they can inform us about the nature of
causal learning processes. For example, the link between cause and
effect is not directly observable and so causal learning involves a
psychological process that extracts cues to causality, the temporal
and contingency relationships between events [4,5]. For example,
cause and effect occur successively, often in close spatial proximity
[6], and the effect should be contiguous and contingent upon the
occurrence of the cause [7,8]. However, it is the combination of
these cues that is critical in terms of defining causality, as any of
them taken in isolation could be misleading [9,10].
Time, in terms of succession and contiguity, is often considered
to be the essential causal cue, while patterns of cause-effect co-
occurrence provide additional corroborative information
[9,11,12]. In other words, if information about the contingency
between cause and effect is consistent with a causal relationship,
but time information is not, then people are less likely to judge that
a causal relationship exists [7]. However, determining whether or
not this is the case is complicated because there is considerable
inter-connectedness between these variables. Time, for example,
not only defines succession and contiguity [4] but also the density
or rate of cause-effect experiences which is relevant to contingency
[13]. Spatial proximity is defined by the context in which events
occur, and the context itself can define action-effect contingency
[14]. Moreover, the passage of time can constitute a change of
context [15] and context is not a discretely occurring countable
event, but a continuous and sometimes temporally defined aspect
of a causal learning task [16]. Thus, it can be argued that time and
contingency, and space or context and contingency, are inter-
dependent and in studies so far, context was not a variable that
was not manipulated and measured explicitly.
Our strategy in the current paper is to consider context
explicitly, alongside the other causal cues, and to manipulate time
and context systematically across different contingency conditions.
Furthermore, we will also test distinct groups of participants
categorized by levels of depressed mood. This is useful because
depression is not only associated with changes in causal sensitivity
[16,17,18,19] but also with disturbed time perception [20,21,22]
and impaired context processing [16,23]. Therefore, levels of
depression will have specific effects on causal judgments, and
moderate the effects of time and context manipulations.
Our starting point is a brief discussion on the status of the
various causal cues in relation to current theoretical perspectives
on causal judgment, before we then discuss how studying the
effects of depressed mood on causal judgment might be a useful
method of informing this debate.
Contingency and time in causal learning
Causal judgments often relate to contingencies with which
people are actively involved rather than being passive observers
and a considerable body of research has focused on whether
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judgments of such action-outcome contingencies bear any relation
to objective mathematical quantifiers of the same relationships.
Given the importance of contingency in causality, we will frame
our arguments around this literature.
The contingency between an action and outcome can be
quantified by a normative metric, known as delta P or ?P [24]. ?P
is a value, similar to a correlation coefficient, which describes both
the direction (generative, preventative) and strength (strong, weak)
of a contingency relationship. It differs from the correlation
coefficient in two ways in that it concerns the frequency of binary
events (on/off) and is a measure of a one-way, rather than
bidirectional, relationship. ?P is calculated as the difference
between the conditional probabilities of an outcome given the
presence of an action, p(Outcome|Action), and the absence of an
action, p(Outcome|No Action). Therefore, the calculated value
can vary between +1, indicating a perfect positive contingency and
a generative causal relationship between action and effect, through
the continuum to -1, where the outcome is less likely to happen in
the presence of the action than in its absence, a preventative
negative contingency. In a situation where the conditional
probabilities are equal, the effect is no more likely to occur in
the presence of the outcome than in its absence, and the ?P is zero.
In other words, there is no contingency relationship between
action and outcome.
This definition of contingency includes the assumption that four
possible action-effect conjunctions are relevant to the ?P calcula-
tions. Figure 1 (upper panel) shows a standardized contingency
matrix in which the frequencies of each conjunction are given in
each cell and denoted by the letters A, B, C and D. In many
experimental designs, each conjunction would take place during a
discrete experimental trial and the experimenter could manipulate
the cell frequencies and thus the contingency experienced by the
participant. Figure 1 (lower panel) shows examples of such
manipulations, a negative contingency (left), a zero contingency
(middle) and a positive contingency (right) condition. After being
exposed to such conditions, participants would be asked to assess
the contingency, perhaps by rating their degree of control over the
effect on a numeric scale, which could then be compared to
systematic manipulations of ?P, similar to those shown in Figure 1.
Studies have shown that people are very sensitive to changes in
manipulated contingencies. Their ratings of the strength of causal
relationships distinguish between conditions, like those shown in
Figure 1, in which effects are and are not contingent upon their
actions [25,26,27]. In addition, ratings are highly correlated with
much more subtle variations in ?P. For example, Wasserman et al.,
[25] exposed their participants to 25 different conditions that
involved subtle variations in contingency. Ratings were almost
perfectly positively correlated with ?P (r= .97), demonstrating
remarkable isomorphism between causal ratings and variations in
contingency. Notably, causal ratings were weakest in conditions in
which contingency was zero (?P= 0), in spite of the fact that these
conditions did involve contiguous pairings between actions and
outcomes. Contingency, it seems, was a crucial cue to causality.
In spite of the importance of contingency for causal learning,
temporal contiguity does have a profound effect on people’s ability
to detect causal relationships. For example, Shanks, Pearson and
Dickinson [7] exposed their participants to positive contingencies
in which the ?P was .75 and the temporal delay between actions
and outcomes varied from 0s to 16 s. A 2 s delay significantly
reduced causal ratings and delays of greater than 4s completely
eliminated any perception of causality. Thus, even in conditions
with a strong contingency between action and outcome, degrading
temporal contiguity attenuated and even eliminated the perception
of causality. These and other findings suggested that time was a
more critical cue to causality than contingency because, even in
the case of a strong contingency, changing the temporal
parameters of the task eliminated the perception of cause
[7,8,28]. That being said, two assumptions underlie that conclu-
sion, that the experienced temporal sequence of event-
outcome conjunctions is consistent with that programmed by the
experimenter, and thus, the contingency experienced by the
participant is also isomorphic with that programmed by the
experimenter. As we discuss later on in this paper, and has been
discussed elsewhere [29], these are two assumptions which can be
questioned.
Figure 1. 262 contingency tables showing the four possible combinations of action – effect information. Note: The upper table shows
generic information from which P is calculated, where A, B, C and D refer to the frequencies of action – effect conjunctions. P=A/(A+B) – C/(C+D). The
lower tables show examples of three contingency conditions with a DP of 2.5, 0 and +.5 respectively (left to right). P(O|A) refers to the conditional
probability of the outcome given the presence of the action and P(O|noA) refers to the conditional probability of the outcome given the absence of
the action.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064063.g001
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Theoretical Approaches to Causal Learning
The debate on whether time or contingency is the more critical
or important causal cue relates to the two broad theoretical
frameworks that each use different explanatory mechanisms to
account for the effects of time and contingency on causal learning.
One approach explains causal learning through a simple time-
sensitive error correction learning algorithm and the development
of simple associations between actions and outcomes, such that the
strength of the association is correlated with the strength of the
causal relationship [30]. Another theoretical approach holds that
people use causal knowledge, including knowledge of the role of
time in causality, to generate propositions or inferences about
whether causality is present, before using contingency information
to assess the strength of that relationship [11,12,31,32]. Consistent
with the latter view, situation specific knowledge of temporality in
causal relationships mitigates some time effects (e.g., delayed distal
effects of cause [33,34,35]), and temporal information has been
shown to override contingency information and mislead, produc-
ing erroneous causal judgments [9]. Thus, temporal information
and knowledge should take precedence over contingency in
inferring causality. Although there are other key differences
between associative and knowledge based models (such as state of
association versus truth of inference [32]), of relevance at this point
are the different mediating mechanisms for time and contingency
effects.
Associative models, such as the Rescorla-Wagner model (RWM:
[36]), explain both time and contingency effects through the
interference of background context in the development of action-
effect associations. For any one effect, there is a finite amount of
associative strength available to the relevant action. Thus,
although all stimuli present at the same time as the putative cause
will develop associative links, they must compete with one another
for their share of the overall associative strength available. Causal
judgments change with variations in contingency because every
time an effect occurs in the absence of the action (see Figure 1), the
context-effect association becomes stronger and this, in turn,
interferes with the development of the action-effect association by
reducing the amount of associative strength available to it.
Similarly, delays between action and outcome allow the experi-
mental context to be more temporally contiguous with the
outcome than the action, allowing the context rather than the
action to develop associative strength [7]. A reduced rate of action-
effect occurrence over time would produce the opposite effect [16].
Thus, while time and contingency are important to the
development of associations and determining the strength of
causal relationships, according to the associative model, the
explanatory mechanism for both effects is through the develop-
ment of interfering contextual associations.
Inference or knowledge based models can also explain the
effects of time and contingency on causal judgments. However,
these models hold that knowledge of time, in terms of contiguity
and succession, is a starting point where causal knowledge is used
to generate initial causal models or hypotheses about a given
situation, with contingency information used secondarily to test
causal hypotheses [37,38] or assess the strength of the causal
relationship [11,12,13]. Importantly, the assumption of the
existence of causal knowledge can, quite naturally, explain data
which associative models find difficult to incorporate. For
example, although delay effects are generally robust, temporal
knowledge provided in the form or instruction or cover story has
been shown to mitigate their effect. Thus plausible delays
consistent with a cover story, such as a grenade being fired
towards a target and producing an explosion several miles away,
are less deleterious to causal learning than unexplained delays
[33,34,35,39]. Although the effect of the plausibility of delay is
often taken as supporting knowledge based models of causal
judgments, it has also been argued that associative models, which
code for time [40], can account for knowledge based time effects
[41].
This short discussion shows that the functions of time, context
and contingency distinguish theoretical accounts of causal
learning. Associative models are time sensitive but explain
contingency and time effects on the causal learning process
through the development of contextual associations. Knowledge
about temporality in causal relationships, on the other hand, is
critical to establishing the existence of cause according to some
knowledge-based accounts of causal learning. Contingency infor-
mation is used subsequently to establish the strength of such causal
relationships, though time can impact experienced contingencies
also through changes in event-outcome conjunction categorization
(i.e. cell A might be experienced as cell B [29]). However, in terms
of which perspective, if any, is best supported by empirical
evidence, and as we have argued above, time and context are
inter-twined. Moreover, thus far, the interplay between time and
context in causal learning has not explicitly been studied. In the
next section, we argue that introducing an individual difference
variable into experimental work, namely depression, may prove
fruitful in terms of elucidating the mechanisms responsible for time
effects on causal learning.
Depression and causal learning
Depression effects on causal learning are particularly important
because existing evidence suggests that they are moderated by
experiences of time and context. For example, a growing body of
evidence shows that even quite mild levels of depression affect
people’s ratings of the causal consequences of their actions
[18,19,42,43]. In order to explore the mechanisms underlying
these effects, several studies have manipulated exposure to context
by varying the length of time - the duration of the inter-trial
interval (ITI) – during the causal learning procedure when no
other events take place [16,44]. For participants categorized as
non-depressed, the trend was for long ITIs to increase the
perception of causality in the presence of a zero or positive
contingency, but weaken that impression in the presence of a
negative contingency. In other words, these time effects were
asymmetrical over contingencies and were consistent with the idea
that the temporal manipulations affected the strength of context-
outcome associations.
On the other hand, participants categorized as mildly depressed
displayed quite a different pattern of effects. A contrast between
medium (3s) and long ITI (15s) exposure did not affect ratings of a
zero contingency [16] but the difference between very short (0.5s)
and long (15s) ITI exposure decreased the perception of causality
with zero and positive contingencies [44], and increased the
perception of negative cause when the contingency was negative
(E3). Although these latter findings were reported as of borderline
significance using a conservative rejection criterion, the trend was
again asymmetrical but diametrically in opposition to those effects
displayed by non-depressed groups. A more conservative position
would of course be that the time/context manipulations had no
effect on the causal judgments made by mildly depressed
participants.
Irrespective of the theoretical interpretation of these particular
findings, it is evident that simultaneously manipulating time and
exposure to the context affected the causal judgments of mildly
depressed and non-depressed people differently. This could
equally be due to mood related changes in time perception
[20,45] or processing of context [23]. However, exploring the
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underlying reason for this difference, whether located at the level
of time or context processing, can inform about the relative
contributions of time and context as causal cues.
In the series of experiments reported here, then, we planned to
test predictions about how a range of temporal manipulations will
affect causal judgments, in particular durations of action-outcome
delays and inter-trial intervals. Predictions can then be extended to
the effects of depressed mood on causal judgments. For example,
numerous studies suggest that time perception is slowed in
depression [22,46], even mildly dysphoric states [20]. If slowed
time perception underlies the effect of depression on causal
learning, this would suggest that time effects will be magnified in
participants who are categorized as depressed. However, it is
equally possible that impaired processing and maintenance of
context representations [23] are responsible for depression effects,
in this is the case, then all time/context exposure manipulations
will have reduced effects in depressed participants in comparison
to controls. Studying how depression levels moderate the effects of
the time and context manipulations, we have just described, will
inform about the combinatorial process underlying causal
judgments as well as elucidate the mechanisms through which
depression affects causal learning.
Experiment 1
Previous studies involving depression, temporal manipulations
or context in causal learning [16,18] have used a limited range of
conditions, mainly those in which the contingency between cause
and effect was zero and outcomes were frequent. This means that
extant data on depression effects in causal learning currently
provide an insufficient baseline against which to explore the effects
of temporal and contextual manipulations in the subsequent
experiments we plan to report here. Therefore, in Experiment 1,
we used an instrumental causal learning task to test a range of
preventative (DP=2.5), generative (DP= +.5) and non-contin-
gency conditions (DP= 0), with different levels of outcome density
(low, high). The cover story and visual stimuli used in the task
included an explicit and realistic context. The goal of this was to
directly consider the role of context in causal learning alongside
the other causal cues. Thus, although indirect evidence for the role
of context can be obtained from temporal manipulations as will be
tested in subsequent experiments, direct evidence can also be
derived from explicit ratings of the causal relationship between the
context and the outcome. This approach to direct measurement of
context is supported by data from previous studies we have carried
out in which causal relationships were embedded in realistic
virtual contexts, with participants then required to rate the causal
relationships between the context, action and outcome [47]. As
expected, context ratings were higher than action ratings with zero
contingencies and this pattern was reversed with positive
contingencies [47] – see supplementary data. Moreover, ratings
were sensitive to relatively small elevations in depressed or
dysphoric mood. Those previous findings indicate the suitability
of a virtual context procedure, like that used in Experiment 1, to
provide a more comprehensive data set than those currently
available, against which to consider the findings of the subsequent
experiments reported here.
Method
Ethics statement. Ethics approval was obtained from the
ethical review committees of the Universities of Limerick and
Oxford for all experiments reported here, and written informed
consent was obtained from all participants prior to participation.
Participants. University students were recruited via a mass
screening method, which required all volunteers to complete the
Beck Depression Inventory, hereafter BDI [48], as a measure of
their current mood state before being invited to participate. BDI
scores were taken again during participation and used to assign 50
participants to the high BDI group (scores of 9 or above: n=24
with n=4 males) or the low BDI group (scores of 8 or below:
n=26 with n=17 males). These criteria are consistent with no
dysphoria in the low BDI group and mild dysphoria in the high
BDI group and have been used in many previous studies [16,18].
As the procedure was not fully randomised, groups were
matched on potential confounds such as age, working memory
capacity, and estimated pre-morbid IQ, which could have
contributed to any between groups effects (see Table 1). Working
memory capacity was measured using the forward version of the
digit span test [49], and premorbid IQ was estimated using
demographic data (for method and equations see [50]). Indepen-
dent groups t-tests showed that there were no between group
differences in age, digit span score or estimated IQ. As expected,
the high BDI group produced significantly higher scores on the
BDI at both at screening and during their visit to the lab (see
Table 1).
Design and Materials. In this experiment, we used a
26(36262) fully factorial mixed design. The within subjects
factors were contingency (negative, zero, positive) outcome density
[OD] (low, high) and cue (action, context). The between subjects
variable was BDI group (low, high). Thus, each participant was
exposed to six different contingency conditions, where the
programmed ?P values were: 20.5 low OD (0.0|0.5), 20.5 high
OD (.5|1.0), 0 low OD (.25|.25), 0 high OD (.75|.75), +0.5 low
OD (0.5|0.0), and +0.5 high OD (1.0|0.5), where the first value in
each parentheses is p(Outcome|Action) and the second value is
p(Outcome|NoAction). The cue variable refers to the two different
causal ratings that participants were required to provide for each
condition, action and context.
Each condition was located within a distinct virtual context
represented by pictures on the computer screen. The action was a
key press on the computer keyboard and the outcome was a 2s
auditory stimulus. Following each condition, participants were
asked to rate their own control (action), and that of the context,
over an auditory outcome using a judgement scale which varied
from 2100 (labelled totally prevent) through 0 (labelled no
influence) to +100 (labelled totally control). Order of presentation
was counterbalanced using a Latin squares design. Presentation of
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of participants in
Experiment 1 compared across low and high BDI groups.
Demographics BDI group
Independent groups t
test
Low BDI High BDI
(n=26) (n =24)
M SE M SE t p
Age 20.73 0.36 20.83 0.63 0.14 0.886
Digit Span 8.19 0.27 8.29 0.27 0.26 0.795
Estimated IQ 110.23 0.90 109.42 1.23 0.54 0.595
BDIScreen 5.46 1.00 21.75 2.66 5.74* ,.001
BDILab 4.04 0.57 23.5 2.59 7.34* ,.001
*Equal variances not assumed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064063.t001
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experimental events was programmed using a Macintosh com-
puter and REALbasic (2009, Release 2.1) software.
Procedure. During their visit to the laboratory, participants
were briefed verbally about the nature of the experiment and then
given a written information sheet to read. After giving written
informed consent, participants provided demographic informa-
tion, completed the digit span task, and questionnaires measuring
mood state. Following this, instructions about the causal learning
task requirements were displayed on the computer screen. The
cover story required participants to imagine that they were in a
house in which there was a hidden stereo system. They could
control the music switching on in each of the rooms in the house
(distinct contexts) using a remote control. However, participants
were told that the remote control had been working intermittently,
and that sometimes music switches on when no one is touching the
remote control. The task was therefore to test the remote control
in each of the rooms separately.
For each test, participants were told that they would be taken to
the particular room and that they should wait to receive a message
on the computer screen saying that they were allowed to test the
remote control by pressing the spacebar on the computer
keyboard. This would happen on many occasions (experimental
trials) while they were in the room, and participants could choose
to press the space bar at that point, or simply observe. In order for
participants to properly gauge what happens when they did not
press the button, they were asked to press on approximately half of
the possible occasions.
Each experimental trial was constructed such that the message
signalling the possibility of the action would stay on the screen for
3s. If the spacebar were pressed during this period, the button on
the remote control shown on the screen would show as depressed.
No further responses were possible during that particular response
time window. At the end of the time window, the music would
either play for 2s at a probability of p(Outcome|Action) or the
room would remain silent. If the spacebar were not pressed during
the time window, then the music would switch on for 2 s at a
probability of p(Outcome|NoAction). This 5s procedure consti-
tuted one experimental trial, of which they were 40 in each
condition, separated by a 3s inter-trial intervals (ITIs) during
which the same visual stimuli (the virtual context) remained the
same as during the trial.
At the end of each set of 40 trials, a judgement window was
displayed and participants were required to rate the causal
relationship between their own action and the outcome, and
between the distinct context and the outcome using sliders
displayed on the computer screen. The judgement sliders were
constructed with increments of +/21, so that the full range of the
judgement scale (2100 to +100) could be used. After completing
all six conditions, participants were thanked, debriefed and paid a
nominal fee for their participation. All participants were also
provided support information relevant to mood states.
Results and Discussion
Participants rated the control of their actions over the outcome
as well as that of the context in six different conditions, including
negative, positive and zero contingencies with a low and high
density of outcomes. These data are shown in Figure 2 and suggest
that participants’ ratings distinguished between action and context,
and between the contingencies and the density of outcome
occurrence. However, the experimental manipulations seemed to
have a weaker effect on ratings made by the high BDI group in
comparison to the low BDI group.
These observations were examined using a mixed (36262)62
factorial analysis of variance, with contingency, outcome density
and cue as within subjects factors and BDI group as the between
subjects variable. An alpha level of .05 was used here and
throughout unless stated otherwise. As we might have expected,
contingency affected all ratings, F(2, 96) = 43.07, p,.001,
g2 = .47, MSE =1077.63, but the direction of the contingency
effect depended on which cue, action or context, was rated, F(2,
96) = 113.32, p,.001, g2 = .70, MSE =1084.63, as well as
participant group, because the three-way interaction between
contingency, cue and BDI group was significant, F(2, 96) = 7.59,
p= .001, g2 = .14, MSE = 1084.63. Before exploring that
interaction further, it is important to note that the density of
outcomes affected ratings, F(2, 96) = 131.67, p,.001, g2 = .73,
MSE=2592.03, but that this effect depended on the cue rated,
F(1, 48) = 4.40, p= .041, g2 = .08, MSE =1774.47, and the
contingency, F(2, 96) = 8.80, p,.001, g2 = .16, MSE =1051.46,
but not BDI group, p= .12. In general, although the ratings of low
and high outcome density conditions were located in different
regions of the judgment scale the pattern of difference was similar.
High outcome density conditions always received action ratings
and context ratings that were more towards the positive end of the
judgment scale than low outcome density conditions. For negative
contingency conditions, this meant that high outcome density
action ratings were weak and located nearer to zero on the
judgment scale than low outcome density action ratings.
Further analyses of the contingency, cue and BDI group
interaction revealed quite straightforward effects. For action
ratings, the contingency by BDI group interaction was significant,
F(2, 96) = 6.68, p= .002, g2 = .12,MSE = 1004.28. Both low and
high BDI groups were sensitive to the difference between
contingency conditions, where negative , zero , positive ratings
(p,.001 for both groups, with all pairwise comparisons p,.001).
However, as revealed by the significant interaction, the size of the
contingency effect was greater for the low BDI group (g2 = .89)
than the high BDI group (g2 = .72). For the context ratings, again
the simple interaction between contingency and BDI group was
reliable, F(2, 96) = 3.73, p= .028, g2 = .07, MSE =1877.98. For
the low BDI group, context ratings were significantly affected by
contingency, F(2, 50) = 23.65, p,.001, g2 = .49, MSE =1343.89,
with the ordering of mean context ratings being in the opposite
direction to action ratings, negative . zero . positive, with all
pairwise comparisons significant with p,.005. In the high BDI
group, however, contingency had no effect on context ratings, F(2,
46) = 1.34, p= .26, thus negative = zero = positive context
ratings.
In summary, when participants, categorized as having low or
high BDI scores, were exposed to a series of six different
contingency conditions, low BDI participants’ ratings were
consistent with a greater degree of discrimination between the
contingencies than high BDI participants, and this was consistent
irrespective of the density of outcomes. Previous work has only
found differences between mood groups in specific high outcome
density conditions when each participant was only exposed to one
contingency condition [16,18]; the findings of this experiment
show more widely spread mood effects which are present in
conditions more similar to the real world in which there are
numerous contingencies to judge and compare. In addition, these
results provide direct evidence for the first time of mood effects on
people’s ratings of the context’s causal relationship with the
outcome in a wide range of conditions. The high BDI group’s
context ratings did not vary as a function of contingency as the low
BDI group’s ratings did.
The findings do show very clearly how, for low BDI groups,
their ratings of the causal role of the action varied systematically
and with their causal ratings of the context. This is certainly
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consistent with the view of context as playing an important role in
causal learning. The high BDI group, on the other hand, did
discriminate between contingencies in terms of their action ratings
but not their context ratings. High BDI context ratings did not
change significantly across contingency although they did reflect
levels of outcome density. This pattern is suggestive of causal
judgments that interact less with context, or background, as
possible causes of effects, though are highly sensitive to the
background rate of outcomes.
The findings of Experiment 1 therefore provide us with baseline
measures of causal relationships between action, context and
outcomes across multiple contingency conditions. They are
informative in their own right, in particular as previous studies
have always been suggestive that mood effects on causal judgments
only occur in very specific conditions, with zero contingencies [51]
especially with long temporal intervals between trials. In fact, one
criticism of this area of research has been that these findings are so
specific as be rather meaningless in the real world [52]. However,
the results of Experiment 1 do show that pattern of differences in
causal learning attributable to depressed mood are more pervasive
than previously thought.
Experiment 2
In the next set of experiments, we varied the durations of the
inter-trial interval (ITI) and the action-outcome delay in condi-
tions with a moderately positive contingency and a high density of
outcomes (DP =0.5). Both are manipulations of time but are
simultaneously manipulations of exposure to context and both
theoretical models made specific predictions about the effects of
these manipulations.
From the perspective of associative learning theory, predictions
are straightforward. Long action outcome delays mean that the
constantly present context enjoys greater contiguity with the
outcome that the action and this will strengthen context-outcome
associations. Longer durations in between experimental trials
(ITIs) would have the opposing effect, creating long periods of
context exposure in the absence of the outcome, thus weakening
the association between context and outcome. However, these
consequences of the strength of the context association will be
dependent on the specific contingency condition tested. When
contingencies are positive or zero, strong and weak context
associations will weaken and strengthen ratings of the action’s
causal relationship respectively. In the case of a negative
contingency, however, the effects would be reversed such that
the stronger context association would actually promote a stronger
preventative causal relationship between action and outcome. In
other words, associative theory would predict asymmetrical time/
context effects that are contingency dependent.
These predictions diverge from those made by knowledge-based
models and the following discussion explains the reasons for this
and then describes specific predictions. We particularly refer here
to causal structure models [12] as examples of what Lagnado and
Sloman [9] refer to as hypothesis driven accounts of learning.
According to this view, knowledge of temporality in causal
relationships is key to determining whether or not a causal
structure exists. This is only one part of the process. Following
that, contingency data is used to determine the strength of the
causal relationship. In the experiments reported here, both
components of the process are required as participants are asked to
rate how much, if any, control they have over the music switching
on. Accordingly, in order to make the rating, they must use their
knowledge of the plausibility, ontology and form of causal
relationships to establish whether it exists or not, before
establishing its strength [12].
According to Griffiths and Tenenbaum, it seems likely that
people make different assumptions about generative and preven-
tative relationships (with different strength parameterization
calculations following on from this). However, given the plausi-
bility of a generative relationship in the experimental scenario used
here (remote button usually causes music to switch on), and the
relative implausibility of a preventative relationship (remote button
doesn’t usually prevent music from switching on), it seems likely
that people would assume a generative relationship and use their
temporal knowledge in this way, such that delay is incompatible
with causality. Specifically then, in this generative scenario, delay
effects should be contingency independent, should be symmetrical
across positive and negative contingencies, and should eliminate
the perception of causality. This would be the case unless the
notion of prevention is very clearly part of the causal scenario [53],
which was not the case here (i.e. the rating scale allowed for
prevention, but the scenario did not include it). We will return to
these points later in the general discussion.
While predictions about delay do seem to distinguish the
models, predictions around ITI duration do not. Instead they
relate to how rates and probability of event occurrence are linked
Figure 2. Ratings of the causal strength of the action and the context. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean. NB: LD =
low outcome density, HD = high outcome density, Neg = negative contingency, Zero = zero contingency, Pos = positive contingency.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064063.g002
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to knowledge in the first place and then use of contingency
information to qualify initial assessments. As with associative
theory, asymmetrical causal ratings would be predicted. Increasing
the duration of the ITI will reduce the base rate of the effect
[p(Outcome|No Action)] because of the conceptual similarity
between ITIs and the D cell of the contingency table, and would
increase the perception of generative causality and decrease the
perception of preventative causality, as predicted by associative
theory as well. However, there is some ambiguity to these ITI
predictions. If rate and probability are processed online over time,
rather than over N trials [5] (N trials would likely be controlled by
the experimenter), then for a given time window, longer ITIs
might also decrease the perceived rate of action-effect co-
occurrences as well. In other words, both relevant conditional
probabilities [p(Outcome|no Action) and p(Outcome|Action)]
would decrease, maintaining the overall contingency, having no
effect on causal strength. Thus, as causal strength is based on
contingency information experienced over time, knowledge based
theory could also predict the ITIs would have no effect on the
strength of causal ratings.
One methodological issue, however, is that manipulating
durations, which occur within or between trials, also affects the
overall duration of exposure to a particular contingency condition
[44]. Conditions with longer ITIs and delays necessarily involve a
longer procedure time than shorter ITIs and delays if numbers of
trials are held constant across conditions. We therefore carried out
two versions of the experiments reported next; one in which the
number of experimental trials was held constant while procedure
time was varied (version A), and another in which the number of
experimental trials was varied while procedure time was held
constant (version B). We only report the details of the individual
experiments where relevant, as there were no significant differ-
ences between the two.
Method
Participants. All participants completed the Beck Depression
Inventory on two occasions, a maximum of 14 days before
participation and then again during the visit to the lab.
Participants were assigned to mood groups on the basis of the
BDI scores taken in the lab (Experiment 2a: N=50; Experiment
2b: N=53). In this experiment, we used median BDI scores to
assign participants to the low and high BDI groups. Consequently,
those who scored 5 or below on the BDI were assigned to the low
BDI group while those who scored 6 or above were assigned to the
high BDI group. Mood effects have been observed using the same
criteria in previous experiments [47]. The data for five participants
were excluded, one female participant due to computer malfunc-
tion, and four other participants due to low response rates p(R)
,.13). The characteristics of the final sample are shown in Table 2
and comprised N=46 participants in Experiment 2a and N=52
participants in Experiment 2b.
The low and high BDI groups were compared on a range of
relevant demographic variables using multivariate analysis of
variance, including age, years of education, and scores on the digit
span test. There were no significant differences between BDI
groups on these variables, or across Experiments 2a and 2b (see
Table 2). All participants received a nominal payment for their
participation.
Design and Materials. This experiment used a 26 (26262)
mixed factorial design, where BDI group (low, high) was the
between subjects variable. The within subjects variables were delay
(short 0 s, long 4 s), ITI length (short 3 s, long 15 s) and cue
(action, context). These durations of delay and ITI have been used
in previously published studies [7,16]. The factorial combination
of experimental manipulations resulted in four conditions expe-
rienced by all participants, with two ratings – action and context –
made for each condition. Order of presentation was counterbal-
anced using a Latin squares design.
The procedural details were the same as the previous
experiment except that durations were varied. Table 3 shows
the duration of each component of the procedure. In all
conditions, there was a 3s period in which participants could
choose to make the action. One difference between this
experiment and Experiment 1, is that if an action occurred during
the 3 s response window, then the outcome followed immediately
or after 4s at a probability of p(Outcome|Action) rather than at the
end of the response window. If no action was recorded by the end
of the response window, then an outcome followed immediately or
after 4s at a probability of p(Outcome|No Action). Outcomes
lasted for 2 s. In Experiment 2a, each condition included 60 trials
with the duration of each condition varying accordingly, whereas
in Experiment 2 b, the number of trials was varied in order to hold
the duration of each condition constant (see Table 3). In all cases,
the overall procedure time, including all four conditions, lasted for
64 minutes.
In all conditions, there was a moderately positive contingency
(DP= .5) between the action and the outcome, such that actions
always resulted in an outcome with a probability of 1.0 and trials
with no action resulted in an outcome at a probability of .5.
Procedure. Procedural details are identical to Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
As with the previous experiment, participants rated the
effectiveness of their own actions, and the effectiveness of the
context, in controlling the occurrence of the music. These data,
combined across Experiments 2a and 2b, are described below and
shown in Figure 3.
In general, participants judged that the causal role of their own
actions was stronger than the causal role of the context. However,
the effects of delay and ITI length seemed to depend on both BDI
group and the specific causal role rated. The data were analyzed
using Analysis of Variance with the following variables, cue, delay
and ITI, included as within subjects factors, with BDI group (low,
high) and Experiment (2a versus 2b) entered as between subjects
variables.
The analyses showed that action ratings were indeed signifi-
cantly higher than context ratings, cue: F(1, 94) = 50.35, p ,.001,
g2 = .35, MSE =3040.38, and that delay affected ratings also,
F(1, 94) = 19.40, p,.001, g2 = .17, MSE = 1361.91. However,
delay effects depended on cue, cue 6 delay: F(1, 94) = 6.16,
p= .015, g2 = .06, MSE =1372.49, as well as ITI length, cue6
delay6 ITI: F(1, 94) = 6.69, p = .011, g2 = .07, MSE =782.27,
and BDI group, cue 6 delay 6 ITI 6 BDI: F(1, 94) = 9.92,
p= .002, g2 = .10, MSE =782.27. None of the effects or
interactions involving Experiment (2a versus 2b) were reliable or
were explored further.
In order to explore the four-way interaction between cue, delay,
ITI, and BDI group in more detail, we split the data by BDI group
and carried out further analyses. For the low BDI group (Figure 3,
left), the cue by delay interaction was reliable, F(1, 43) = 7.97,
p= .007, g2 = .16, MSE =970.62, although the cue by ITI
interaction was not reliable, p= .19. Although we might have
expected an effect of ITI length on action judgments, and there
was some suggestion of this in Figure 3, the ITI effect on action
judgments was not reliable, p= .18. Simple effects analysis showed
that whereas long delays reduced action ratings significantly, F(1,
43) = 16.14, p,.001, g2 = .27, context ratings remained the same,
p= .30.
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The pattern was different in the high BDI group. The cue, delay
by ITI interaction was reliable, F(1, 51) = 15.38, p,.001, g2
= .23, MSE =923.16. When delays were short (squares, Figure 3),
ratings were not dissimilar to the low BDI group, with action rated
significantly higher than context, p , .003, g2 ..16, and with no
discernible effect of ITI length, p ..12, g2 ,.05. However, when
delays were long, action judgments increased and context
judgments decreased significantly with longer ITIs, both ps ,
.02, both g2 . .10. In other words, ITI effects were strongly
evident but only in long delay conditions. In long ITI conditions,
there was no difference between short and long delay action
judgments, F(1, 51) = 1.04, p= .31.
Taken together these findings show that manipulations of the
time and context affect causal judgments but that the nature of
these effects depends on levels of depressed mood. For low BDI
groups, there were trends, some significant, towards effects
observed in previous studies. Longer action-outcome delays
reliably decreased people’s judgments of causal relationships,
whereas longer ITIs did not reliably affect causal judgments.
These effects were not mirrored in context judgments. Thus, this
pattern of findings is most consistent with the notion of a time-
based moderation of causal judgments in low BDI participants.
However, it could be argued for several reasons that the data
from high BDI groups was consistent with effects related to time
and context. This is because slowed time experience in depression
should magnify the effects of time manipulations, whereas
impaired representation or processing of context would reduce
the strength of time effects. Consistent with the slowed time
experience view, the delay and ITI effects were stronger in high
BDI groups’ judgments. However, this magnification of time
effects concurrently affected context ratings in a manner consistent
with contextual mediation of time effects.
The implications of this are as follows. In Experiment 1, we
observed strong mirroring of action-context ratings in low BDI as
a function of contingency effects. This might suggest then that the
time manipulations, tested with identical contingency conditions in
Experiment 2, were not strong enough to produce the action
context mirroring in low BDIs that we observed in Experiment 1.
However, for high BDIs, their slower time experience increased
perceived duration to the extent that time effects were stronger
and thus mirrored in context ratings. The fact that ITI effects,
which involve much longer durations and therefore more accrued
time, were stronger in long delay conditions is consistent with this
interpretation of the findings.
Experiment 3
Negative or preventative contingencies (see Figure 1) may be
more informative than positive contingencies. This is because if
the plausible causal relation is generative, knowledge based
accounts predict that action outcome delays will reduce or
eliminate the perception of action-outcome causality. However,
associative theory would not make the same prediction. This is
because contingency effects on causal learning are based on the
strength of context as well as action associations. In the case of
negative contingencies, context associations are very strong in a
positive direction, whereas action associations are strong in an
inhibitory direction. This means that context associations could be
asymptotic, such that increasing the action outcome delay would
likely not increase the strength of the context association.
Moreover, any effect of delay on strengthening the context
association would be likely to increase rather then decrease the
Table 2. Experiment 2a and Experiment 2b demographic characteristics, comparisons across experiment and mood group.
Demographics E2a E2b Exp comp Mood comp
BDI group
Low (n=19) High (n = 27) Low (n = 26) High (n = 26)
M SE M SE M SE M SE p p
Age 22.47 1.62 22.11 .81 21.12 1.12 20.85 .50 .20 .84
Digit Span 8.37 .21 7.93 .36 7.77 .25 7.35 .29 .07 .21
Education 16.05 .40 16.26 .31 15.42 .25 15.77 .34 .08 .31
BDI Time1 3.11 .67 11.85 .89 3.00 .47 14.81 1.38 .64 ,.001
BDI Time2 2.11 .38 11.26 .91 2.15 .34 13.38 1.43 .84 ,.001
Note: Exp comp = comparison of demographics across experiments; Mood comp = comparison of demographics across mood groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064063.t002
Table 3. Component durations (s) and numbers of trials in each condition in Experiment 2.
ExperimentalConditions Programmed Durations Experiment 2a Experiment 2b
Delay ITI Action s Delays Outcome s ITIs TrialsN
Total
Times TrialsN Total times
Short Short 3 0 2 3 60 480 120 960
Short Long 3 0 2 15 60 1200 48 960
Long Short 3 4 2 3 60 720 80 960
Long Long 3 4 2 15 60 1440 40 960
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064063.t003
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perception of preventative cause. Long ITIs on the other hand
would weaken the context association, and therefore reduce the
inhibitory strength of the action association towards zero.
Similarly, from the knowledge-based perspective, the effect of
ITI on causal strength would be to reduce the perceived base rate
of the effect or outcome [p(Outcome|No Action)], eliminating the
perception of causal strength. If perceived rates of action-outcome
occurrences over time are also reduced, this could mean that ITI
has no effect on ratings.
Method
Participants. Ninety-nine participants took part either in the
fixed trials (Experiment 3a: N=50) or the fixed time (Experiment
3b: N=49) experiment. They completed the BDI as in the
previous experiment and were assigned to the low and high BDI
groups using the same median split criteria (BDI = 5 cut off).
However, data from seven participants were excluded for low
response rates (n=2: p(response) ,.15) and high response rates
(n=4: p(response) . .85), and one further participant didn’t use
the keyboard as instructed which resulted in missing data. The
characteristics of the final sample are shown in Table 4 and
comprised N=44 participants in Experiment 3a and N=49 in
Experiment 3b. There were no significant differences across
experiments or mood groups on demographics, although high BDI
groups scored significantly higher on the BDI at both time points
than low BDI groups.
Design and procedure. The design was identical to Exper-
iment 2, except that a negative contingency was tested (DP =2.5).
Actions resulted in an outcome at a probability of .5, whereas trials
with no actions always ended in an outcome (p=1). The
instructions and judgment scale were identical to the previous
experiment, as were the procedural details.
Results and Discussion
Participants were exposed to a moderately negative contingency
and rated the extent to which their actions and the context
controlled or prevented the occurrence of the music. These data
are combined across Experiments 3a and 3b. Action ratings made
by low and high BDI groups are shown in Figure 4 (filled symbols).
For high BDI groups only, longer ITIs and longer delays appeared
to be associated with more negative action ratings.
In order to explore these observations, the data were analyzed
in the same way as in Experiment 2. Context ratings were
significantly different to action ratings, such that context was rated
as a facilitator of the outcome and the action was rated as a
preventer of the outcome, Cue: F(1, 88) = 189.72, p,.001, g2 =
.68, MSE = 4526.87. Notably, action-outcome delay had no
significant effect on ratings, F,1. Membership of the BDI group
did significantly influence ratings, BDI: F(1, 88) = 5.62, p= .02,
g2 = .06, MSE = 2721.05, and the difference between action and
context ratings, BDI6Cue: F(1, 88) = 4.09, p= .046, g2 = .044,
MSE =4526.87. As there was a three way interaction between
cue, delay and BDI group, F(1, 88) = 4.46, p= .038, g2 = .048,
MSE =1711.78, this was the starting point for further analysis
involving the BDI variable. Finally, there was also a significant
Figure 3. Effects of ITI length and delay duration on ratings of positive (100/50) contingencies. Data are combined across Experiments
2a and 2b. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean. A = action ratings, C = context ratings.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064063.g003
Table 4. Experiment 3a and Experiment 3b demographic characteristics, comparisons across experiment and mood group.
Demographics E3a E3b Exp comp Mood comp
BDI group BDI_num1low
Low (n=23) High (n=21) Low (n =25) High (n=24)
M SE M SE M SE M SE p p
Age 20.13 .28 20.81 .80 19.36 .80 20.33 .72 .37 .23
Digit Span 8.26 .27 7.86 .46 8.00 .24 8.33 .21 .75 .96
Education 15.61 .27 15.10 .30 15.78 .31 15.38 .22 .44 .10
BDI Time1 3.52 .76 10.62 1.83 3.56 .70 10.33 1.25 .98 ,.001
BDI Time2 2.04 .31 11.38 1.16 2.20 .33 10.83 1.14 .95 ,.001
Note: Exp comp = comparison of demographics across experiments; Mood comp = comparison of demographics across mood groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064063.t004
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interaction between cue and ITI length, F(1, 88) = 4.27, p= .042,
g2 = .046, MSE =903.23, which also required further analysis.
Firstly, further examination of the cue by delay by BDI
interaction, confirmed that both low and high BDI groups rated
the context very differently to the action, all Fs.79, all p,.001, all
g2 ..63, and this difference was consistent across short and long
delays, all ps ..13. Further tests showed that the source of the
three-way interaction was that high BDI participants rated the
context as a stronger cause of the outcome than low BDI
participants, specifically in long delay conditions, F(1,88) = 11.44,
p= .001, g2 = .12, MSE =1448.83. This was not the case with
short delays or with action ratings, all Fs,.2.12, all ps..14. We
also checked whether long delays produced reliably more negative
ratings in long versus short delay conditions, as suggested in
Figure 4, however, that effect was not reliable, F(1,43) = 2.10,
p= .16, g2 = .05, MSE =1636.75.
Finally, we also examined the cue by ITI length interaction.
Despite a trend towards ITI effects on causal ratings of the action
for all participants, simple effects analysis showed that this was not
significant, F(1, 88) = 3.78, p= .055, g2 = .04, MSE =753.17.
There was no suggestion of any ITI effect on context ratings,
p= .25.
Overall, in Experiment 3, the context was rated as a facilitator
of the outcome whereas the action was rated as a preventer. Delay
and ITI length had no effect on ratings made by the low BDI
group. However, the high BDI group rated the context as more
strongly facilitative than the low BDI group, specifically in long
delay conditions, although this effect was not mirrored reliably in
action ratings where the delay effect did not reach criterion.
Therefore, in this particular condition, in which the context was a
strong cause of the effect by nature of the specific contingency
tested, temporal manipulations had no effect on action ratings.
Experiment 4
The previous experiment was designed to pit the predictions of
associative and knowledge based models against each other.
Moreover, we also wanted to test whether depression effects on
causal learning were consistent with slowed time perception in
depression strengthening the effects of temporal manipulations,
with subsequent effects on causal learning through contextual
associations. The lack of delay effects on action ratings of negative
contingencies in the previous experiment is not entirely consistent
with either theoretical approach, however it might be that the
specific negative contingency tested in Experiment 3 was less likely
than any other negative contingency to produce temporal effects.
The specific condition tested in Experiment 3 (see Figure 1,
lower left) was programmed such that 50% of action trials and
100% of no action trials, during which the context was always
present, resulted in an outcome. This configuration, with such a
level of high outcome density, would mean that the context and
outcome were frequently paired and the association between
context and outcome would be very strong and possibly near to
the limits of associative or causal strength. In addition, and from a
more probabilistic perspective on delay, if a long delay between
action and outcome means that the trial is processed as a context-
outcome trial instead, cell C rather than cell A [29], the original
100% likelihood of outcome occurrence after a no action event is
at ceiling and cannot therefore be increased. This does not explain
why ITI effects were not observed in Experiment 3, however, but
we cannot discount the fact that the findings might be related to
the specific contingency tested.
Therefore, Experiment 4 will repeat the previous experiment
(including fixed trials and fixed time versions) with a medium
outcome density negative contingency. While the absolute level of
contingency (DP =2.5) will be the same, only 50% of trials will
end in an outcome where 25% of action trials and 75% of no
action trials will be followed an outcome. This means that the
context will be paired with the outcome on fewer occasions than
Experiment 3, and the problematic 100% outcome rate after no
action trials is no longer the case.
Method
Participants. Recruitment and BDI completion was carried
out on the same basis as previous experiments. One hundred
participants completed Experiment 4a (fixed trials: N=50) or 4b
(fixed time: N=50). However, the data for nine participants were
excluded due to response rates ,.15 or ..85. The final sample
comprised 44 participants in Experiment 4a and 47 in Experiment
4b (N=91). The characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 5.
Education data was missing in Experiment 4a and therefore no
experiment or mood group comparisons are reported for that
variable. BDI scores were always significantly different between
the low and high BDI groups but not across experiments.
Experiment 4b participants were significantly older than Exper-
iment 4a participants. Also high BDI participants were signifi-
cantly younger than low BDI. Experiment was included as a
variable in all analyses as in the previous experiments.
Design and procedure. All details were the same as previous
experiments except that a moderate outcome density, negative
contingency condition was tested. Outcomes occurred on 25% of
action trials and 75% of no action trials.
Figure 4. Effects of ITI length and delay duration on ratings of negative (50/100) contingencies. Data are combined across Experiments
3a and 3b. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean. A = action ratings, C = context ratings.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064063.g004
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Results
Participants rated the action and the context in relation to
control over the outcome and the data are shown combined across
fixed time and fixed trials versions in Figure 5. The data show a
similar pattern to the previous experiment. Action ratings are in
the negative portion of the scale and context ratings in the positive
end, with little evidence of delay or ITI effects in low BDI ratings.
High BDI ratings also looked similar to the previous experiment,
except that the effect of longer delays, which pushed their actions
ratings in a more negative direction, seemed more pronounced in
Figure 5 than in the previous experiment.
The data were analysed as in Experiment 3. The difference
between context and action ratings was significant for all
participants, Cue: F(1, 87) = 130.86, p,.001, g2 = .60, MSE
=4393.04. In addition, the effect of delay was moderated both by
cue and by BDI group, Delay6Cue6BDI: F(1, 87) = 4.00, p
= .049, g2 = .604, MSE =4393.04. Examining the low and high
BDI groups separately showed that for low BDI groups there was
no effect of delay on either cue, Fs ,1, ps ..5. However, in the
high BDI group, there was a cue dependent delay effect, F(1, 43)
= 4.56, p= .038, g2 = .10, MSE =1875.73, such that there was no
delay effect on context ratings, F,1, but long delay action ratings
were significantly more negative than short delay action ratings,
F(1, 43) = 8.73, p= .005, g2 = .17, MSE =1431.82.
This pattern of results is very similar to the previous experiment.
Again, delay and ITI manipulations did not affect low BDI groups’
context and action ratings. However, for the high BDI groups,
stronger action ratings of preventative cause in long delay
conditions, an effect that was weak and did not reach criterion
in the previous experiment, was reliable and based on medium to
large effects according to Cohen’s [54] criteria. This is consistent
with the delay effect increasing in strength in negative contingen-
cies when there is a lower level of outcome density, high levels of
which promote very strong context-outcome links. While this may
be the case, in a supplementary analysis, we combined the data
from both negative contingency experiments, and checked
whether the cue6 delay6 BDI group interaction depended on
the specific contingency (25/75 versus 50/100) condition tested.
There was not the case and there were no reliable differences in
the interaction between the two experiments, F(1, 179) ,1,
p= .99. This finding with high BDI groups only is consistent with
slowed time experience magnifying time effects in both positive
and negative contingencies in a manner that has a knock on effect
on the strength of context associations
General Discussion
In this series of experiments, we set out to explore the processes
underlying causal learning, in particular how time and context
manipulations affect causal judgments, with depression included as
an important moderator variable. Unlike previous studies
[7,33,34], and mindful that time manipulations simultaneously
affect exposure to the context, we explicitly included measures of
context causality. We also tested groups of low and high scorers on
a depression scale for whom time and context processing
impairments have been documented [20,21,23]. We found that
for participants with little evidence of depression, effects of time
Table 5. Experiment 4a and Experiment 4b demographic characteristics, comparisons across experiment and mood group.
Demographics E4a E4b Exp compMood comp
BDI group BDI group
Low (n=21) High (n=23) Low (n=29) High (n =18)
M SE M SE M SE M SE p p
Age 19.67 1.04 18.39 .20 22.38 .77 20.72 .53 ,.001 .02
Digit Span 7.43 .43 7.00 .24 8.21 .23 8.33 .40 .001 .37
Education – – – – 17.05 .43 14.67 1.16 – –
BDI Time1 4.62 .66 13.96 1.64 3.14 .53 13.72 1.49 .13 ,.001
BDI Time2 2.38 .39 13.87 1.72 2.72 .45 12.12 1.33 .15 ,.001
Note: Exp comp = comparison of demographics across experiments; Mood comp = comparison of demographics across mood groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064063.t005
Figure 5. Effects of ITI length and delay duration on ratings of negative (25/75) contingencies. Data are combined across Experiments 4a
and 4b. Error bars correspond to the standard error of the mean. A = action ratings, C = context ratings.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064063.g005
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manipulations were only apparent in specific positive contingency
conditions. However, for participants scoring higher on the
depression scale, time effects were generally stronger and present
with positive and negative contingencies. We will discuss these
findings in more detail below, also using the contrast between low
and high depression scorers, and inconsistencies with previous
findings, to inform the theoretical implications of this work.
In this series of experiments, we firstly verified that the strength
of instrumental causal judgments, made across a range of
contingency conditions, varied with similar ratings made about
the relation between the context and outcome. This was the case
for participants scoring low on the depression scale. However, high
BDI groups’ context ratings did not vary with action ratings in the
same way across contingencies, suggesting a degree of ‘de-
contextualization’ in their causal judgments in the absence of
any specific temporal or contextual experimental manipulations.
This effect was accompanied by action ratings that did not
discriminate between contingencies to the same extent that low
BDI groups’ ratings did. This pattern of findings supports the idea
that context typically does have a key function in causal learning,
as suggested by associative theories [5], but that this mechanism is
vulnerable to low levels of depression and perhaps other
psychopathologies.
Further experiments were then designed to test the interrela-
tions between time and context in positive (Experiment 2) and
negative (Experiments 3–4) contingencies. Two different time
periods were manipulated, the delay between action and outcome
and the empty delay between experimental trials, that are thought
to weaken and strengthen respectively people’s assessments of the
causal role of the action. These time effects distinguished low and
high BDI scorers. We found that longer time delays did not always
reduce the perception of cause for low BDI scorers. While delayed
outcomes were perceived as less causal with positive contingencies,
as in previous studies, they had no effect on causal judgments
when the contingency was negative. It could be argued that this
finding suggests that, all other factors being equal including
knowledge of temporality and the plausibility of delay in that
causal situation, time delays do not always eliminate the
perception of a causal relationship as knowledge based theory
might suggest [9]. We will return to this theoretical point shortly,
however, it is the findings from high BDI scorers that are more
suggestive of underlying mechanisms.
Firstly, it is useful to reconsider the original predictions that we
made about time and depression. Depression has consistently been
associated with slowed time perception [20,22], which could
increase the impact of time manipulations, but also impaired
context processing [16,23], which could decrease time effects if
they are context based. In the time manipulation experiments
reported here, time effects on ratings made by the high BDI
groups were stronger than for low BDI participants and it is
possible that slowed time perception is the cause of this effect.
However, with positive contingencies, both delay and ITI
influenced causal ratings, with action and context ratings being
influenced in opposition. This might suggest then, that for these
participants, slowed awareness of time exerts its effect on causal
learning through extended exposure to context and the conse-
quential effect of that on the strength of context associations,
rather than the effect of time per se.
Even more informative is the finding that delayed outcomes
increased rather than eliminated high BDI participants’ percep-
tions of preventative cause in negative contingency conditions.
This means that, for these participants, delay effects were
asymmetrical around zero across the judgment scale (ratings of
positive short . positive long . negative short . negative long).
While knowledge based theory would predict symmetrical delay
effects that eliminate the perception of causality (ratings of positive
short . positive long . negative long . negative short), this was
not the case for high BDI participants. The asymmetry of delay
effects is however consistent with the idea that the stronger relation
between context and outcome in long delay conditions would
make an inhibitory association between action and outcome even
stronger as predicted by associative theory.
These findings are consistent with some, but not all, previous
work. For example, Vallee-Tourangeau, Murphy and Baker [8]
reported findings consistent with our low BDI groups that variable
(degraded) versus constant contiguity deleteriously affected positive
action-outcome contingency ratings significantly but not negative
contingency ratings. However, in contrast, Mutter, DeCaro and
Plumlee [55] found symmetrical rather than asymmetrical delay
effects with their younger participants. In their study, depression
was not a variable of interest and they found that long delays
reduced the perception of causality in negative as well as positive
contingencies. Their older participants, like our low BDI groups
and Vallee-Tourangeau et al. ’s participants, displayed no delay
effect on negative contingencies. For the most part then, it seems
that the effects of delayed outcomes are specific to positive
contingency conditions. However, when time effects are enhanced,
here due to mild depressed mood, then the full range of delay
effects are observable but the nature of the effects are contingency
dependent and can enhance and eliminate the perception of
causality.
Other inconsistencies between the findings reported here and
previous studies relate to the effects of ITI duration on causal
ratings. In the present series of experiments, ITI effects on causal
ratings were, for the most part, absent or weak and not reliable.
However, in our previous work [44], although we reported ITI
effects to be weak with positive contingencies, they were strong
when the contingency was negative. One reason for this
inconsistency in ITI effects, as well as the delay effects mentioned
above, might be theoretically important procedural differences. In
the present study, and Vallee-Tourangeau et al. [8], in which
patterns of delay effects similar to ours were reported, the time
manipulations were tested on a within subjects basis. Mutter’s
study [55] and our own previous work, in which different patterns
of delay and ITI effects were reported than those described here,
involved between subjects tests of time variables. The within versus
between subjects distinction of time effect tests is important as it
might imply that time effects are cumulative, such that with
multiple conditions time effects are influenced by preceding
conditions, thereby explaining the difference in findings.
So far, we have discussed several specific pieces of evidence that
inform the theoretical implications of this work and we address this
now in detail. Causal structure models, as one example of a
knowledge based approach, postulate that time is the primary cue
to causality and that contingency is information that is considered
subsequently in the process. So, for example, Lagnado [9] found
that when time information misleads, erroneous causal attributions
result. However, it is also clear that knowledge about the
plausibility of temporality in a given situation [33] and assump-
tions about the functional form of generative (positive) and
preventative (negative) causes [12] will mean that the effects of
time information will be situational. So, for example, Griffiths and
Tenenbaum [12] showed how the effects of outcome density
manipulations on causal judgments of zero contingencies were
reversed by framing the same situations as involving generative or
preventative causes. In experiments, but not real life, such
information is provided either explicitly or implicitly by the causal
scenario. In the present set of experiments, the causal scenario was
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the same throughout. It could also be argued that a generative
causal relationship was most likely assumed because people’s
causal knowledge of remote controls and music switching on
would be consistent with that. If that were the case, outcomes
occurring 4s after the action would not be consistent with existing
knowledge, and delayed outcomes should therefore eliminate or
ameliorate the perception of causality before contingency itself
enters the causal process. On the contrary, participants in the
present study identified the preventative causal relationship
evident in negative contingency condition whatever the delay
between action and outcome. Thus, we argue that findings that
delay effects (low BDIs) are dependent on the contingency tested
and that sometimes delays enhance causal perception (High BDIs,
Experiment 4) are not entirely compatible with causal model
theory.
There is an alternative argument, of course, which is consistent
with other evidence that temporal contiguity between action and
outcome is not essential for accurate causal learning. As mentioned
above, if the experimental scenario includes a plausible reason for
a delay between action and outcome to occur [33], or if another
stimulus is inserted into the delay period [56] then delay effects can
be reduced or eliminated in positive contingencies. It may be then
that a negative contingency can itself act as a plausible reason for
the delay. In other words, people may assume the plausibility of a
preventative relationship between action and outcome, and then
knowledge of the temporal structure of preventative causality is
relevant. Thus action delayed outcome trials might be perceived as
consistent with preventative cause. This initial ‘modal decision’
that a preventative relational structure exists would then allow
contingency information to enter the causal process.
However, the experienced contingency would then depend
on the duration of the temporal window used to determine
whether two events co-occur or not [29,57]. Thus depending on
how event-outcome conjunctions were reclassified in the delayed
time frame, a negative contingency could be experienced as more
negative and thus this would be consistent with our results; or it
might be experienced as random occurrences of outcomes that are
simply not linked to any action response window resulting in an
experienced zero contingency. The latter outcome would be
consistent with Mutter’s results showing that delays eliminated the
perception of negative cause [55]. Notwithstanding, this is
currently an area of theoretical imprecision as temporal windows
are not only argued to be dynamic and changing in response to
incoming information [57] but likely depend on the continuous or
discrete trial nature of the procedure used [58]. Furthermore, it is
also unclear how and under what conditions the modal switch
involved in preventative and generative cause functions. It
therefore could be argued that our findings are consistent with
causal structure models.
Another important question, however, is whether such a
conclusion would be consistent with the nature of the enhanced
time effects we observed on the causal ratings of high BDI
participants. Our findings support the hypothesis that slowed time
perception in depression would augment the effect of increased
delay or ITI. It could be argued then that the high BDI evidence
points towards time dominating the causal process in these
experiments in which contingency and existing causal knowledge
were held constant. Despite this, for several reasons, we would
argue for context as the explanatory mechanism for the effects. At
baseline, high BDIs produced causal ratings that were less
contextualized than other participants. However, delay and ITI
effects in positive contingency conditions affected both action and
context ratings in opposition, implicating a time effect through
context. In these conditions, high BDI judgments were more
contextualized than they had been at baseline. Then when
negative contingencies were tested, delayed outcomes increased
the perception of preventative cause. Taken together, these effects
could be parsimoniously linked to time based fluctuations in
context associations as predicted by associative theory. We might
also speculate that cumulative effects of time over conditions, in
relation to the difference in findings from between versus within
subjects’ designs, fit more readily with a context based associative
learning framework than a causal model perspective.
Thus far we have discussed the findings from low and high BDI
participants based on the assumption that both sets of people
arrive at their causal ratings using the same causal processes but
that these same processes are enhanced or impaired due to state
changes in basic cognitive processing. However, we must
acknowledge an alternative possibility that the two sets of
participants used different processes or were at different stages of
the same processes when they made their causal judgments. For
example, Balleine and Dickinson [59] argued that instrumental
action is underpinned by two different processes, goal directed
action-outcome learning and more habit based stimulus response
learning. Anatomically distinct from each other, goal directed
action is evident early on in the process and this then transfers to
more habitual behavior as learning progresses, which is stimulus
driven and more independent of the outcome. Evidence from
humans and animals also shows that higher levels of stress promote
habit based performance over goal directed action [60], indicating
that state changes can influence the function of these processes.
Along similar lines, Sternberg and McClelland [31] argue that
when there is time, and presumably cognitive resources, available
to them, people will make inference based causal judgments.
However, with less time and cognitive resources, associative
processes would be used. It is possible then that low and high BDI
groups’ causal ratings represent either different causal learning
processes due to the availability of cognitive resources, or different
stages of the learning process.
Two process theories do provide an intuitive account of the data
reported here. However, one question relevant to these data
remains outstanding. Previous research has suggested that under
certain conditions, people with higher levels of depression are
more accurate or realistic in their causal judgments than others
[18]. Realistic causal judgments, observed in some studies, must be
reconciled to judgments which are also strongly affected by time
and context, possibly due to slowed time perception, as in the
present study. One putative reason for this is that slowed time
awareness confers a normative advantage in relation to single
judgments of a contingency, as these judgments would be less
contextualized and more consistent with DP. However, in studies
with repeated judgments, as in the current work, the effects of
slowed time perception would accumulate over the course of
repeated judgments, with appropriate contextualization of the
individual judgments being compromised and perhaps unpredict-
able. Given that multi-judgment experiments bear more resem-
blance to the myriad of causal judgments made in the real world,
although slowed time perception may confer a depressive realism
advantage in some experimental settings, this is unlikely to confer
similar advantage in the real world.
Conclusions
We set out to explore the role of time and context in causal
learning, with levels of depression included as a moderator
variable. Findings are not entirely consistent with either causal
structure models or associative theories. Neither of these models
can fully explain the absence of time effects on negative
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contingencies unless they make additional assumptions. For
example, if contingency acts as a form of prior knowledge then
the question of the psychological precedence of time over
contingency becomes irrelevant because both time and contin-
gency would exert their effect through prior knowledge. However,
if mildly depressed participants data are considered to be
representative of enhanced time effects through slowed time
perception, then findings are more consistent with an associative
model. These findings are also consistent with the idea that the
crucial difference in causal learning, between those scoring low
and high on a depression scale, is located in contextual learning.
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